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5.1 Introduction
This paper seeks to discuss the intersection of property in the right to protest and the right
to housing. Extant eviction resistances fighting marketisation of depleted social housing
stock in London will be referred to, alongside examples of squatting, occupation protests,
demonstrating the coming together of housing and protest, and the ever presence of
individual property rights shaping the resistances of the movements. Where housing and
protest come together is in both formal and informal conceptions of ‘home’, through the
proprietorial rights equated in law, and the respective non-proprietorial adequations of
‘home-making’ that assert little rights at all.
The alternating nature of eviction resistances demonstrates this further encroachment
of private property into the homes of those who then use their spaces to demonstrate. Some
resistances concern tenants occupying their homes before being decanted to make way
for further private housing developments, while others involve protestors occupying resi-
dences highlighting the plight of those losing or having lost their homes.
I argue that this pattern of homes being used for protest, as a result of accelerated
commercial redevelopment projects and social housing buyouts, ends with a shifting lim-
inal of private and public spheres, condoned by local authorities and encouraged through
pro-development presumptions in planning preferences.Where capital is encroaching on
already enclosed space, such as in the decanting of council housing residents and demol-
ishing of run-down estates tomake way for new ‘affordable’ housing, the result is themost
private of acts becoming the most public – the home becomes a site of protest. Nowicki’s
recent use of ‘domicide’ to describe deliberately and legislatively enforced dispossession
is used to characterise the privacy of home meeting the unwelcome arrival of private
commercial interests, and the very public effects of ‘home-unmaking’,1 eviction and protest,
as a result.
Human rights obligations under Article 8 (right to private and family life) and Articles
10 and 11 (freedom of expression and assembly respectively) of the European Convention
1 D. Neumark, ‘Drawn to beauty: the practice of house-beautification as homemaking amongst the forcibly
displaced’, Housing, Theory and Society, Vol 30, No. 3, 2013, pp. 237-261.
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on Human Rights (ECHR) will be discussed in relation to the shape-shifting nature of the
public and private spheres, arguing that a right to housing and a right to protest can
increasingly be used interchangeably in relation to understanding the category of home.
The discussion concludes by considering the temporal continuation of protest to home,
from informal to formal, public to private, to home as pure commodity, back to public
oncemore andwhat opportunities the enclosing of the already enclosed gives for resistance.
“Their eyes see rubble, former exiles see home”2
Given the precariousness of recent global economic times, Fox O’Mahoney contends,
“[T]he crisis in the housing andmortgagemarkets has brought home to us our vulnerability
to displacement and dispossession […] perhaps more so than at any other time in recent
years …”.3 In times when generations are experiencing the threat of eviction and dispos-
session as never before, the coming together of housing and protest is a revealing synergy,
arguably less a meeting of two separate issues than an expression of an innate adequation
of loss enmeshed in outrage, experienced as one.
Critical geographer Nowicki (2014) has recently been calling for a ‘resurrection and
recasting’4 of Porteous and Smith’s (2001) domicide, as a fitting theoretical framework
characterising the loss of homes as a result of theUKhousing crisis.Domicidewas originally
defined by the Canadian geographers back in 2001 as “the planned, deliberate destruction
of someone’s home, causing suffering to the dweller”.5 Agreeing with Nowicki, this piece
seeks to discuss the usefulness of domicide in explaining the culpability of neo-liberal laws
surrounding housing and more widely the heralding of individual private property over
all moral, communal and informal proprietary claims, in affecting eviction and expropri-
ation on a large scale.
The question here, however, is what do we refer to as a home per se, whether legally,
politically or existentially, and do the two conceptions marry up? Why is there so much
resistance and outrage to housing policy and jurisprudence if what we are told about all
we need to survive and exist is beingmet politically and juridically by the government and
the market? Or we may equally question why people are not protesting more about their
own housing situation, given that if they do, they may lose their home.
2 J.D. Porteous & S.E. Smith, Domicide: The Global Destruction of Home, McGill-Queens University Press,
Montreal and Kingston, 2001.
3 L. Fox O’Mahoney in L. Fox O’Mahoney & J. Sweeney (Eds.), The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and
Dispossession, Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, 2011, p. 1.
4 M.Nowicki, ‘Rethinking domicide: towards an expanded critical geography of home’,Geography Compass,
Vol. 8, No. 11, 2014, p. 786.
5 Porteous & Smith supra note 2.
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Using legal understanding of the home,6 in common law and human rights norms, as
well as commentaries on belonging,7 and ‘home-making’8 to understand the connections
we create with place, for however brief or extended an amount of time, this piece seeks to
assert the inextricable link of protest with housing, and, in fact, goes so far as to say that
concepts of home and concepts of protest incite one and the same thing. Reasoning with
the Schmittean idea of all law emanating from the land,9 all protest affects the same alluvial
connection, claims to soil being the basis of law in a democratic society. The root of protest
and housing is our relation with the earth beneath, and it is through the human emotions
of fear and anger, loss and outrage, vulnerability and dispossession that we find them
enmeshed as ethics towards ourselves, the community and the built or natural world
around us. How can we conceptualise this in law, and what new ways are available of
understanding the non-duality of the right to housing and the right to protest? One way
to consider this is through the ambit of convention rights and the useful way rights to
protest and private and family life become blurred, as a result of private commercial
interests entering residential privacy, triggering the most public of acts of eviction and
resistance.
Nowicki’s understanding of home-unmaking is also a very useful way of thinking the
connection between housing and protest and the congenital effect of private property on
the private and public sphere. The presence of private restrictions on the right to protest
and housing rights is specifically expressed in the example of squatting and eviction
resistance, and the extent to which a right to housing is inimically linked to the squatting
and eviction resistance cause and organically linked to protest, whether a home or house
is involved or not. Nowicki’s home-unmaking allows us to understand the temporal fluc-
tuation between what at once can be housing, the next moment protest and back round
again.
I argue that the neo-liberalisation of housing and the resultant effect on those who
have become or are soon to become homeless demonstrates the returning home of property
to a realm it had already excluded, expropriated and enclosed. It certifies a desperate,
lustful urge of capital at the heart of its manoeuvre back to the home of law – the homes
of people. Discussed shall be the shifting position of possession orders and forcible entry,
how they bring short the time of the squatter or the resident at the behest of cash-strapped
local authorities bedazzled by venture capital regenerating social housing stock, or the
courts’ preference to the primacy of private ownership. The discussion will conclude with
6 Such as L. Fox O’Mahoney’s taxonomies of home, see L. Fox O’Mahoney, Conceptualising Home: Theories,
Laws and Policies, Hart, Portland, 2007; L. FoxO’Mahoney, ‘Themeaning of home: from theory to practice’,
International Journal of the Built Environment, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2013, pp. 156-171; FoxO’Mahoney& Sweeney
supra note 3.
7 See S. Keenan, Law and the Production of Spaces of Belonging, Routledge, London, 2013.
8 Neumark supra note 1.
9 See C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, Telos Press, New York, 1950.
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a consideration of the temporal linkage between protest and home, as well as in planning
and law through the accelerated push of time asmoney, property as commodity, expressed
in practices and performances of evictionwhere a home, however temporary or otherwise,
is dispossessed or demolished to make way for ‘progressive’ new housing developments.
5.2 Home, in Law and Otherwise
I have been seeking to find what this inimical linking of housing and protest actually is.
Without being a family lawyer or concerned with the semantic category of home in my
work thus far, this link is probably already obvious to those in such fields.
What is home, and how is it thus far described in law? Is there an inextricable link
between home and protest? Fox refers to four typologies of home in her ‘Conceptualising
Home: Theories, Laws and Policies’10 as (a) financial investment; (b) as physical structure
(as housing); (c) as territory; (d) as identity and self-identity and (e) as social and cultural
signifier.11 For something that is so embedded as part of the human experience, defining
what homemeans is somethingmuchmore complex than a series of indicators, so it seems.
It is not merely a physical relation with a space or place, but one that incites a social and
psychological connection that a person nurtures with a specific abode, and this has been
acknowledged inEuropeanCourt ofHumanRights (ECtHR) jurisprudence such asConnors
v. UK and R (Countryside Alliance) v. AG [2008] AC 713, where Baroness Hale referred
to “the inviolability of a different kind of space, the personal and psychological space within
which each individual develops his or her sense of self and relationshipswith other people”.12
According to feminist geographer Domosh, “the home is rich territory indeed for
understanding the social and the spatial. It’s just that we’ve barely begun to open the door
and look inside”.13 The literature on home and home-making crosses both territorial and
psychological connotation where the catalytic linking of property has been the most
familiar form of connection between the space and the individual, and less likely so, the
collective. The idea of a personal connection to property can be found in thework ofHegel
in his ‘Philosophy of Right’,14 where he claims property is an inimical part of our person-
ality and our free will to realise one’s self, as Fox O’Mahoney discusses in her magnum
opus on the home. The ‘progressive’ property doctrine of Radin, where property is expressed
10 Fox O’Mahoney (2007) supra note 6.
11 Fox O’Mahoney (2013) supra note 6, pp. 159-166.
12 Connors v. UK, ECHR, 27 May 2004, App. No. 66746/01 and R (Countryside Alliance) v. AG [2007] UKHL
52.
13 M.Domosh (1998) cited inA. Blunt, ‘Cultural geography: cultural geographies of home’, Progress inHuman
Geography, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2005, p. 504.
14 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (T.M. Knox, Trans. from German), Clarendon, London, 1952
(original work published in 1820).
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as personhood, “serve[s] as an explicit source of values for making moral distinctions in
property disputes”.15 Yet what kind of property are we talking about here? Is it one based
on landed matter or material possessions,16 or more one concerned with a connection we
feel to a place, person or thing?
Keenan’s recent eloquent work on property and belonging, ‘Law and the Production
of Spaces of Belonging’17 deals with this relational and spatio-temporal dimension of what
it means to be ‘at home’, drawing on the work of Ahmed,18 on the intimacy of bodies and
their ‘dwelling’ places where the role of space and time is congenital to how we relate our
bodies to the external and existential world around us. She claims: “[B]y analysing property
spatially – instead of focusing on the subject of property – subject-object and part-whole
belonging overlap to the extent that they become indistinguishable”.19 The relation between
whole and part, subject and object, is one that is ‘held up’ in spaces, “that are conceptually,
socially and physically shaped towards them: spaces of belonging”.20Work such asKeenan’s
allows for a spatio-temporal understanding of our relation of the home in property, which
can be a connection to a thing, person, race or creed, feelings of attachment to matter or
mind oriented in time and space. By allowing for a conception of dwelling – aHeideggerian
dasein21 –to be, to exist, to reside, a domain of commorancy, plots us in coordinates of not
just elements of materiality and embodiment in terms of a house,22 but where housed does
not solely have to be concerned with property, or at least an individual proprietorial right
per se. It is further interesting to consider accounts of home-making where processes of
trauma and dispossession indicate the integral performative quality of ‘practicing home’,
for no matter how short a temporal duration. Neumark speaks of ‘beautification’ rituals
of those who have nomaterial and certainly no legal claim to a home,23 with squatting and
eviction resistances posing as examples of the integral role of the home within protest, as
somewhere at the centre of one’s existence,24 where one can be at peace and sleep.
15 She states “There is both a positive sense that people are bound up with their homes and a normative sense
that this is not fetishistic” inM.J. Radin, Reinterpreting Property, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and
London, 1993, p. 54; see also R. Radin, ‘Property and personhood’, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 5,
1982, pp. 957-1015, 35.
16 Stern discusses how the psychology research illustrates the primacy of social relations, not possessions, to
self and flourishing, see S.M. Stern, ‘Residential protectionism and the legal mythology of home’,Michigan
Law Review, Vol. 107, No. 7, 2009, pp. 1093-1144.
17 Keenan supra note 7.
18 S. Ahmed, ‘A phenomenology of whiteness’, Feminist Theory, Vol. 8, 2007, pp. 149-168.
19 Keenan supra note 7, p. 6.
20 Id., p. 7.
21 See M. Heidegger, Being and Time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans. from German), S.C.M. Press,
London, 1962 (Original work published in 1927).
22 See D. Clapham, ‘The embodied use of the material home: an affordance approach’, Housing Theory and
Practice, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2011, pp. 60-376.
23 “…Home is a particularly active site of thematerial, affective and ideological identity reconstruction necessary
to the re-establishment of a sense of belonging”, see Neumark supra note 1.
24 A. Husni-Bey’s Convention on the Use of Space, 2015, available at: <www.useofspaceconvention.org/>.
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Needless to say, Fox’s ‘x-factor’ categories of the home, as Nield remarks, in her recent
chronology of ECHRdefences in human property rights,25 have been chiselled andwhetted
so as to fit some fairly terse frameworks personifying the meaning of home in human
existence. Are these frameworks of the home so easily classifiable as identity, to territory
to physical structure and back again? In law the concept of the home is still in chrysalis
formation, with FoxO’Mahoney construing, “The idea of home is both present and absent
in law”,26 where to the extent that given the socio-economic presumption of housing as
an onerous obligation on the state, home as a category is one that has been left deliberately
vague within national and regional legal frameworks. Nield explains that there is a disjunc-
tion in law between home as construed in property rights and the understanding of the
home in informal or transient non-proprietorial settings where there is no ownership link
between the individual and place concerned. This is where human rights have created
whatGray andGray27 have termed a “new equity” in property throughwhich homewithout
ownership has an opportunity to be considered in law. Article 8 of the ECHR, right to
respect for private and family life,28 is the closest thing we have to a right to housing at the
national level (brought into our law through Section 1, schedule 1 of the Human Rights
Act 1998 (HRA). In the case law referring to Article 8 at the European and national levels,
“a home is defined not by property rights but by the ‘sufficient and continuing links’ that
a victim develops with a particular place in which they live or have lived”.29 Indeed, Nield
and Hopkins both go so far as to say a home “right should be recognised as independent
of any Article 8 right enjoyed by other occupiers, even those without a property interest
in that home”.30
Article 8 and the human rights language has been pivotal in developing the legal con-
ception of the home, and one that should be afforded to all, as having somewhere to live,
outlined by LordBingham inHarrowLBC v.Qazi [2004] 1AC983 as one of the ‘few things
[…] more central to the enjoyment of human life’. Indeed, the Article 8 provision and the
manner in which it has been interpreted at the national and regional levels reminds us of
25 S. Nield, ‘Article 8 respect for the home: a human property right?’, King’s Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2013,
pp. 147-171.
26 L. Fox O’Mahoney in Fox O’Mahoney & Sweeney supra note 3.
27 See K. Gray & S.F. Gray, Land Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.
28 Art. 8 of the ECHR states: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence; 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”
(ECHR, 1950).
29 See Gillow v. UK (1986) 11 EHRR 335; Blecic v. Croatia (2005) 41 EHRR 13; Zehentner v. Austria (2011) 52
EHRR 22, listed in Nield supra note 25, p. 149.
30 S. Nield & N. Hopkins, ‘Human rights and mortgage repossession: beyond property law using Article 8’,
Legal Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2013, pp. 431 and 149.
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the human connection with land, where the development of a ‘right to housing’ per se has
over the years been a cause of controversy, its vague character affecting a benign protection
for those who cannot rely on a specific proprietorial claim to the land they call home, and
are suffering its loss or imminent loss.
Encouragingly, Kenna asserts, “the recent case-law of international monitoring bodies
and courts is building on earlier precedents and decisions, leading to more efficient and
coordinated protection of housing rights”.31 Under international law, a developing recog-
nition of a right to housing is found within the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1976) pursuant to Article 11(1), where states parties
recognise the right of everyone to a standard of living for himself and his family, including
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living condi-
tions”.32 It can also be found nestled in other treaties such as Article 25(1) of the Universal
Declaration onHuman Rights (1948), Article 5(e)(iii) of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the 1976 (Report of Habitat:
United Nations Conference on Human Settlements [United Nations publication, Sales
No. E.76.IV.7 and corrigendum], chapter I).33 It is also included at the EU (European
Union) level as an autonomous right at Article 31 and housing assistance at Article 16 of
the European Social Charter (1966).34 We all know, however, that international law is
subject to the mood of its signatory sovereign states, and thus the qualified, derogable and
reservable position of the soft norms and aspirations of housing are not those that are
enforceable on states unless they are willing to accede to them through domestic law or
the legal requirements of regional treaty obligations.
The norms of international law underscore what it means to have one’s understanding
of home brought to an abrupt end, to suffer its interruption where the right not to be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s ‘privacy, family, home, or corre-
spondence’, is a congenital part of the right to private and family life. Forced eviction is
“prima facie incompatible” with the requirements of the ICESCR, for instance, and can
31 P. Kenna & D. Gailiute, ‘Growing coordination in housing rights jurisprudence in Europe?’, European
Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 6, 2013, pp. 606-614.
32 International Covenant on Economic, Social andCultural Rights (ICESCR) (1976), contained in document
E/1992/23.
33 As well as other treaties with interpretable right of housing provisions Art. 14 (2) of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Art. 27 (3) of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, Art. 10 of the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, Sec. III (8) of the Vancouver
Declaration onHuman Settlements, Art. 8 (1) of the Declaration on the Right to Development and the ILO
Recommendation ConcerningWorkers’ Housing, 1961 (No. 115), seeUNCommittee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the
Covenant), 13 December 1991, E/1992/23, Retrieved on 26 September 2015 from <www.ref-
world.org/docid/47a7079a1.html>.
34 Kenna & Gailiute supra note 31.
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only be “justified in themost exceptional circumstances, and in accordancewith the relevant
principles of international law”.35
Nevertheless, how do these aspirations for the home connected to the economic and
social rights of housing, whether on a proprietorial basis or otherwise, become enforceable
at the national level? As Nield highlighted, there is less worry over the legal protection
afforded to home-owners,36 where the rights of paper title holders seem to reign over all
others. It is the striation of the home by the economic and political actions of themarketised
state, and its trickle-down effect on the legislators and jurisprudence governing individual
property that leaves those who have a purely de facto kindred with their surroundings out
in the cold. The disjunct of the gritty reality of cash-strapped councils succumbing to
solicitation by big business’ ‘planning gain’, the neo-liberalisation of housing associations
and the development of new affordable37 housing at the cost of decanting extant residents
from aging social housing stock comes up as a stark reminder of the neglect of informalised
rights to the home at the national level, against the pursuit to protect rights to housing at
the international level. This question of commercialisation and affordability38 is likely to
become a key point of contention when urban housing strategies, deprivation and home-
lessness are the key focus ofUNSpecial Rapporteur onHousing in themandate 2014-2017
and the implementation of Habitat III from October 2016.39
Despite this, Kenna asserts that there is evidence to suggest the semantics of the home
and housing is loosening across European jurisprudence through accounting for Articles
31 and 16 of the European Charter as well as rulings coming out of the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU), somewhat at the ECtHR level through the recognition of
35 Para. 18 states: “depending on the legal system, such areas might include, but are not limited to: (a) legal
appeals aimed at preventing planned evictions or demolitions through the issuance of court-ordered
injunctions; (b) legal procedures seeking compensation following an illegal eviction; (c) complaints against
illegal actions carried out or supported by landlords (whether public or private) in relation to rent levels,
dwelling maintenance, and racial or other forms of discrimination; (d) allegations of any form of discrimi-
nation in the allocation and availability of access to housing; and (e) complaints against landlords concerning
unhealthy or inadequate housing conditions. In some legal systems it would also be appropriate to explore
the possibility of facilitating class action suits in situations involving significantly increased levels of
homelessness.”
36 Given the subprime mortgage crisis at least there have been some protections put in place as per the
Financial Regulations Authority (‘FSA’) and Financial Services Act (2012).
37 An example of theUK’s ignorance of international housing norms can be seen in the dismissed legal challenge
from nine London boroughs against Boris Johnson’s plan to allow affordable rents to be set up to eighty
per cent of the market rate; see L. Robertson, ‘Boroughs lose fight against Boris’ affordable rent plan’,
Islington Gazette, 25 March 2014, Retrieved on 20 September 2015 from <www.islingtongazette.co.uk/
news/islington_family_roars_housing_is_our_right_we_ll_never_stop_our_fight_1_4217676>.
38 ‘Adequacy’ has been the subject of recent UN General Assembly proceedings, UN General Assembly,
Adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, Seventieth sessionPromotion
and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving
the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 4 August 2015, A/70/270, Retrieved
on 27 September 2015 from <www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Housing/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx>.
39 UN General Assembly supra note 38.
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alternative forms of housing as ‘dwellings’, and the guarantee of the right to shelter, even
for illegally residing persons through recent Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria 25446/06
2012 andWinterstein and Others v. France 27013/07 2013 cases.40
5.3 Public versus Private versus Privacy – Right to Protest and
Housing
A conundrum of special interest to this paper is how the right to protest and housing is
expressed specificallywhen a building is occupied or squatted as a result of neo-liberalisation
of housing stock, or through the tangible ‘closing in’ of the doctrine of adverse possession
inEngland andWales, registration and criminalisation as characteristic of the encroachment
of private property in land. I am intrigued how this movement of enclosure of individual
property reveals a not always distinct division between a right to housing and the right to
protest andwhether the protections for those claiming such rights in theUK and countries
signatory to the ECHR are satisfactory or whether they need a total rethinking. To what
extent and how far can we go with Article 8 of the ECHR in terms of not just foreseeing a
right to housing, but allowing a space in which one can dissent, and how can Articles 1041
and 1142 protect those protesting the loss or potential loss of their and others’ homes?
Considering the developing area of supranational law around housing rights, the pro-
visions give a clear illustration of the intersecting connections with not just protest as to
what it means to be at home, but also the enmeshedness with a number of other rights in
order for housing to be ‘adequately’43 assured. In the European Committee on Economic
and Social Rights (ECSCR) General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, it is
stated that housing rights rely on the fulfilment of rights to health, to education, to
employment, as well as to non-discrimination and equality, to freedom of association or
40 Kenna & Gailiute supra note 31.
41 This is the right to freedomof expression, a qualified right by way of law in the interests of national security,
among other considerations under 10 (2): “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises”.
42 Another qualified right 11 (2) of freedom of assembly and association: “Everyone has the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and to freedomof associationwith others, including the right to form and to join trade
unions for the protection of his interests.”
43 It goes further to delineate what ‘adequacy’ actually means, listing the determinates as (a) Legal security of
tenure; (b) Availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure; (c) affordability; (d) habitability;
(e) accessibility; (f) location; (g) cultural adequacy. TheCommission onHuman Settlements and theGlobal
Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000 have stated: “Adequate shelter means ... adequate privacy, adequate
space, adequate security, adequate lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and adequate
location with regard to work and basic facilities – all at a reasonable cost”, see General Comment No. 4:
The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant), 13 December 1991, E/1992/23, para. 8,
Retrieved on 26 September 2015 from <www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079a1.html>.
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freedom from violence, and ultimately to the right to life, “… the inherent dignity of the
human person … from which the rights in the Covenant are said to derive requires that
the term ‘housing’ be interpreted so as to take account of a variety of other considerations”.44
Under paragraph 9 of the ECESR comments on the right to housing, the inimical role
of the right to protest in home-making comes through in the integral necessity of states
to accommodate freedomof expression and association for “tenants and other community-
based groups, the right to freedom of residence and the right to participate in public
decision-making”.45 This recognition of the protection of the home in countenance and
gathering is prescient given the eviction resistance and squatting examples burgeoning in
recent years.
The coming together of housing rights and a right to protest has become resoundingly
clearer through a two-stage process: first, there is less and less public space in which to
protest, to express and gather freely in places that do not have a state guarantee of protection
of rights due to the accelerated privatisation of space. The underlying encroachment of
private property into previously public spaces where freedom of expression and assembly
had been under the protection of the state leaves less and less room in which to dissent,
unless in your home – but we know from recent eviction resistances that even that is not
sacrosanct. This is the manifestation of the closing in of rights to protest through the role
of property and the preponderance of now private and quasi-public spaces. The consistent
upholding of the right to peaceful possession of a landowner whose land is being used to
facilitate protest in its variant forms over that of the rights to freedom of assembly and
freedom of expression of protestors leads to the question, how can the right to protest ever
be considered viable in light of the rights of paper title owners? Similarly, how can Article
8 ever protect you from losing your home if you are facing the force of Article 1 Protocol
146 of the landowner whose land you are on?
There have been a number of cases relaying the increased privatisation of space and
the equal demise of protest protections such as protestors being banned from privately
owned shopping malls in Appleby 2003 37 E.H.R.R. 38 or where climate change activists
have come up against heavy civil lawsuits by energy giants on whose land demonstrations
have taken place (West Burton climate change activists being threatenedwith a civil lawsuit
from energy conglomerate EDF being a prime example) and the well-documented use of
private lawmechanisms to removeUK students during university occupations (University
of Sussex v. Protestors [2010] 16 E.G. 106 (C.S.) (Ch D); School of Oriental and African
44 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 4 supra note
43.
45 Id.
46 Protection of property is a qualified right under Art. 1 (1, 2): “Every natural or legal person is entitled to
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public




Studies v. Persons Unknown [2010] 49 EG 78). There have been some interesting questions
in relation to protests around anti-fracking demonstrations and how the police responded
on the one hand, and the judiciary on the other, with the courts seemingly more in favour
of allowing the protestors some scope for a ‘climate change defence’ first mentioned in
Kingsnorth. Charges here, however, weremade under public order interventions, not private
law, and predominantly concern the obstruction of the highway and thus not privately
owned property.
It may seem as though the highway is one of the last bastions of remaining legally
defined public space, and yet we see little protest movements these days with the heart and
soul of the likes of ‘Reclaim the Streets’ (RTS), where roads are occupied, trees planted in
upturned tarmac, flowers cheekily strewn across abandoned burnt out cars and mis-
chievously snuck into the rim of a police officer’s hat. The politics of individual property
pervades all to the extent that protest itself is seemingly confined to those radically engaged
and not the import of the everyday private person, and yet the exaggerated drive of private
accumulation has now meant the divisions between private and public are skewed even
further, where protest increasingly is taking place within the privacy of the home (whether
that of the protestor or not). The 2015 Manchester’s St Anne’s Square and Castlefield
‘Homeless Rights for Justice’ tent occupations succumbed to an injunction to remove them
from a ten-week-old encampment in the city, in a similar move to the City of London
Corporation’s removal ofOccupy St Paul’s inCity of LondonCorp v. Samede [2012] EWCA
Civ 160, where a combination of Article 8 (right to private and family life of the homeless
residing at the encampments) and Articles 10 and 11 claims were rebuffed in light of the
paper title owner, and a recourse to private lawmechanisms of dealingwith protest camps.47
Second, there is less and less privacy in which to live, to be at home, nowhere sacrosanct
from private market interests, the results being the commodification of shelter and the
47 The Occupy encampment of St Paul’s also brought to light the unassumed nature of what appeared to be
public space, with the proprietary rights of the City of London and the proportional rights of the Church
and its supporters, outweighing the rights of those protesting (Samede [2012], following the decision to
move them [2012] EWHC 34 (QB). The rulings were inevitably in favour of the landowners, once again
remedied through the use of private law mechanisms. In Samede, claims of members of the camp’s rights
under Art. 8 being infringed were dismissed, the distinction between occupation of land for protest and
those as a home being clearly delineated. On 22 February, theOccupy St Paul’s were given their opportunity
to appeal. The Occupy St Paul’s protest, like the other Occupy protests, was illustrative of the quasi-public
nature of the occupying law of not just the state, but capital, when it comes to the division of proprietors,
the crossing over to trespass and the use of the rights of the highway to protect the land that had been
occupied. The City of London Corporation and the Church were the concerned proprietors, and the Stock
Exchange too. According to Stuart Fraser, the City of London Corporation’s Chairman of Policy and
Resources: “Protest is an essential right in a democracy – but camping on the highway is not and we believe
we will have a strong highways case because an encampment on a busy thoroughfare clearly impacts the
rights of others” (Samede). Paternoster Square, where the St Paul’s encampment had been situated, is now
technically a city walkway, allowing police to remove future encampments straightaway, without a court
order.
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removal of people from their homes. The neo-liberalisation of social housing is one such
example of the encroachment of commercial rights into the privacy of the home. In the
ECESR’s view, any right to housing should not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive
sense such as “the shelter provided bymerely having a roof over one’s head or views shelter
exclusively as a commodity”,48 something that sadly echoes as sentiment and not action
where state and market are coming together in the commodification of not just housing,
but the commodification of the homeless. The liberalising of grant funding in housing
associations characterises shelter being viewed increasingly as a commodity by state and
market forces, opening up a previously charitable-run sector to private investors, the
people it housed and their connection to their place of being, who can be bought and sold
just as in any other marketplace.49 The housing association-dominated sector, which had
unique access to grant funding to provide new ‘social housing’, has now been infiltrated
by the private sector where competition for grants were first introduced through the
Housing Act 2004 and the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. Similarly, the Localism
Act 2011 replaced the ‘Tenant Services Authority’, the auditing body that regulated social
housing, with the less independent statutory regulatory committee Homes and Commu-
nities Agency (HCA).50 According to Handy, “This liberalisation of access to grant has
brought with it some regulatory challenges […] where there is a powerful argument that
due to liberalisation of the development of affordable homes is far from a ‘public’ func-
tion”.51
In an example local tomy home andwork, the coming together of right-to-protest and
right-to-housing arguments were clear in the case of the now evicted collective of ‘Radical
Bank of Brighton and Hove’,52 in defence of impending possession order proceedings.
‘RadBank’, as it is better known, was an occupation of an empty Barclays bank building
in the London Road area of Brighton, by activists, locals, students and, undoubtedly, the
homeless too who set up Brighton’s first squatted social centre for many years. As the
building was of a commercial nature, it fell under the old regime of squatting law under
6, 7, 12 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 that allows for squatters to remain in occupation
until a court order removes them, and not forcible removal as Section 144 of the Legal Aid
Sentencing andPunishment ofOffendersAct (‘LASPO’) 2012 allows in deemed ‘residential’
48 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 4 supra note
43.
49 Themajority of Housing Associations in England andWales have now been or will be reclassified as public
bodies, M. Tran, ‘Majority of housing associations in England to be reclassified as public bodies’, The
Guardian, 30 October 2015, Retrieved on 26 September from <www.theguardian.com/soci-
ety/2015/oct/30/majority-of-housing-associations-in-england-to-be-reclassified-as-public-bodies>.
50 C.Handy, ‘The governance and regulation of housing associations: latest developments‘, Journal of Housing
Law, Vol. 17, No. 31, 2014.
51 Id.
52 See <www.radicalbank.wordpress.com/> [accessed 19 June 2015].
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properties. RadBank were given as little as two days’ notice to find legal representation
and prepare themselves for the court hearing,53 and, as a result, had to stand in court as
litigants-in-person. The cuts to legal aid specifically put squatting cases outside the scope
of civil legal aid under Schedule 1 Part 1 of LASPO. It is interesting that despite the collective
arguing the infringement of their Article 8, the judge dismissed their arguments declaring
‘rights cut bothways’, inferring the predominance of Article 1 Protocol 1 of Barclays Bank,
in this particular instance. Had RadBank had the legal representation and notice to prepare
that would have allowed a fair hearing, a lawyer would have quickly corrected the judge
with a reminder that despite its apparent unhindrance in possession claims, the right to
peaceful enjoyment of possessions remains a qualified right.54
Radbank is one of just many cases where informal Article 8 or Articles 10 and 11 rights
will fail when they come up against the rights of peaceful enjoyment of possessions of the
absent landowner. Most interesting has been the development of precedent around the
application ofArticle 8 in protests in theManchester Ship CanalDevelopments Ltd v. Persons
Unknown [2014] EWHC 645 (Ch) case, where Article 8 as a defence in protests on private
land can be engaged and have the potential to trump the Article 1 Protocol 1 right of
peaceful possession of property by the landowner in ‘exceptional circumstances’. The
horizontal use of theHRA1998was possible following the decision in the ‘GrowHeathrow’
caseMalik v. Fassenfelt [2013] EWCACiv 798, [2013] 3 E.G.L.R. 99, where the court itself
must comply with human rights obligations under Section 6 of the act, thus allowing for
human rights protections against actions of private bodies. Looking at the usefulness of
the right to protest in protecting the right to a home, Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention
did not provide the defendants with a defence to the possession claim, this following the
decision in Sun Street Property Ltd v. Persons Unknown [2011] EWHC 3432 (Ch), Times,
January 16, 2012 (‘Bank of Ideas’ protest occupation of an empty USB Bank property
during the Occupy protests in 2011), where there was no authority to suggest Article 11
had any basis for overriding property rights. Despite this, what is of import is the fact that
freedom of expression and assembly were even being considered in relation to possession
claims by private landowners in Manchester Ship Canal consequently indicates Article 8
can also be engaged in protest cases. The anti-frackers, as part of a protest camp, had to
show they had been using the occupied private land as a home, as per the sufficient and
continuous links test of Buckley v. UK (1996) 23 EHRR 101, which even if they had met
the requirements of the test, a possession order would still be deemed proportionate to
53 Brighton County Court, 16 June 2015.
54 The old regime of squatters’ rights, reliant on state-sanctioned time limitations to possession of property
under the Limitations Act 1980 and controlled by the Criminal Law Act 1977, satisfies this qualification of
peaceful enjoyment of property, in balancing the public interest to access property with that of any sanctity
of private property guarantee, see JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. The United Kingdom, ECHR, 30August 2007, App.
No. 44302/02.
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remove them from the paper title owner’s land. It is worth considering whether disposses-
sion really is as fair a solution as it is deemed to be in law, and as seen by the domestic
courts of England andWales, particularly in light of recent eviction resistances that highlight
the pain and trauma connected with expropriation.
With the development of case law around the protections afforded in housing and
protest rights, it is demonstrable that we have a situation where there is less public space
in which to dissent, with the result that privacy itself becomes invaded by private capital,
where peoples’ homes are either becoming the site of protest or are the focus of such. We
end up with the most discrete of acts, that of the home-making, becoming subsumed into
the most public of spectacles – that of demonstration, resistance and eviction.
5.4 Housing Protest
The coming together of housing and protest rights reminds us of the commodification of
not just public space, but also social housing stock, at the same time as the street is
becoming increasingly viable as a home bymany as a result of the very same commodifying
processes. The Manchester protestors, and those of the St Paul’s Occupy camp, were a
mixture of the homeless, activists or protestors resisting expropriation, a prevalence in
instances whereby the actions are not only symbolic resistances where supporters and
campaigners are raising awareness around housing issues, but the activists themselves
have directly lost or are threatened with removal from their place of residence as a result
of the interweaving of law and venture capital targeting the most basic of all human and
animal practices, that of being at home.
The connection with land and home rings true again as rights to protest and rights to
housing come together in direct action, both symbolically contesting the enclosure of
private property while at the same time halting the extraction fromone’s place of existence
as is happening in the eviction resistances against the neo-liberalisation of housing stock
in theUK. The police holding and questioning of Jasmin from the ‘Focus E-15’55 resistance
in East London, specifically highlighted the draconianmeasures brought against individuals
contesting dispossession of their homes, the criminalisation of protesting for housing
specifically, reasserting this convergence of resistance and habitat all over.
There is a certain type of protesting that takes place at the same timewithin someone’s
home, and about someone’s home. This kind of protest can be squatting or eviction resis-
tance, with the variant legislative frameworks in place across both common and civil law
jurisdictions, from state to federal, determining how squatting is regulated. Squatting and
55 R. Booth, ‘Focus E15 housing activist arrested on suspicion of squatting’, The Guardian, 14 April 2015,




eviction resistance bring up a whole host of paradoxes within the law that remind us of
the landed nature of property, followed logically by the functioning of state law in general,
on to the characteristic of protest itself. To claim an outrage in protest, to assert an opinion,
demands the apportionment of time, a moment in which to be heard, the space in which
this detraction resides, to stake a claim that ultimately relies on our association with the
environment around us. This association is always the earth, the land, our placement at a
given time within a sovereignty, where, arguably, all protest seeks to assert the protection
of each of our conceptions of home.
Squatting and recent examples of eviction resistance have varying degrees of distinction
of legal protection or lack thereof, dependent upon the permission to occupy granted by
the landowner. Eviction resistance can include those symbolically squatting empty council
houses in protest of decanted residents tomake way for new ‘affordable’ housing develop-
ments, where they had never had any permission to occupy in order to protest; those who
had been subject to tenancy agreements and licences that had ended or been terminated
prematurely, thus their right to remain on the premises subject to contestation; or those
whose proprietary rights to remain within a building are intact but they are preparing for
and opposing their imminent removal. The latter two varieties would not constitute
squatting in the traditional sense of the taking of land by wrong as the residents had per-
mission and an existing right to be there, albeit not for long. Squatting normally involves
the occupation of someone else’s land without their permission, and the removal from the
land with a court order.
Those staying in occupation beyond the end of a licence or lease are not committing
an offence under Section144(2) of LASPO56; however, recent cases have demonstrated the
lack of protection afforded in statute and interpretation of common law for those whose
tenancies or licences that are temporary, that have been brought short or are under review.
It seems as though there is more protection afforded in the old regime of squatters’ rights,
where you are removed only once a court order has been issued, which you would think
would be more precarious than being given permission to occupy by an authority con-
cerned. However, in R. (of on the application of N) v. Lewisham LBC [2014] UKSC 62, it
has been demonstrated that statutory duties of authorities to continue to provide Section188
accommodation under Housing Act 1996 can be terminated without a court order with
56 s.144 (2) – “The offence is not committed by a person holding over after the end of a lease or licence (even
if the person leaves and re-enters the building)”.
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no obligation to protect those with licences under Sections 3(1),57 3(2B)58 and 5(1A)59 of
the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.60 Lewisham LBC highlighted the reluctance of the
courts to extend an understanding of home to anything beyond very narrowmargins, with
a majority Supreme Court ruling of five to two that Section 188 ‘dwellings’ under the
Housing Act 1996 are not tantamount to ‘residences’ under Sections 3 and 5 of Protection
from Eviction Act 1977, and their far from progressive majority stance on what it means
to be forcibly removed from a space of belonging,61 to use Keenan’s language, however
temporary that might be. In light of this, it is a concern that tenants, in general, are less
likely to protest about their living situation and proprietorial agreements with councils,
housing associations or private landlords, for fear of eviction and forcible removal from
the very outset.62 Nevertheless, as we have seen, a home can be both formalised and
informalised in law, squatting highlighting instances where the occupier’s understanding
of home and protest go together and are enmeshed as one, not fazed by the threat of eviction
in order to defend where one resides. It is the violent striation of space of belonging by
forcible entry that brings us closer to an understanding of not just home, but the elemental
role of protest in attachment, to a space, for however abrupt a temporality, and the culpable
role of state law in its permissiveness.
As a prescient gauge of the severity of the housing situation in the UK, at the moment
there has been a wave of eviction resistance and squatting occurring across London and
other urban centres around the country. Eviction resistances, social centres, whether
squatted or otherwise, are not new tactics of protest; there is a long tradition of ‘direct
housing’ actions, going back to the post-WorldWar era countering the shortage of housing
in the aftermath of destroyed stock, with a second wave of squatting for homes then fol-
lowing from the late sixties, where families were rehoused in empty homes by the likes of
‘London Squatters Campaign’ and the ‘Family Squatters Advisory Service’. A third wave
of squatting has been seen in recent years since the seventies, shaped by the legal fiction
57 s.3 (1) Where any premises have been let as a dwelling under a tenancy which is [neither a statutorily pro-
tected tenancy nor an excluded tenancy] and (a) the tenancy (in this section referred to as the former tenancy)
has come to an end, but (b) the occupier continues to reside in the premises or part of them, it shall not be
lawful for the owner to enforce against the occupier, otherwise than by proceedings in the court, his right
to recover possession of the premises.
58 s.3 (2B) in relation to any premises occupied as a dwelling under a licence, other than an excluded licence.
59 s.5 (1A) provides that no less than four weeks’ written notice must be given to end “a periodic licence to
occupy premises as a dwelling”.
60 The two appellants of the case were children of families who had been given temporary accommodation
by the London Boroughs of Newham and Lewisham under s.188 of Housing Act 1996 while their housing
applications were considered. Unfortunately, their applications were refused, at which point the statutory
duty under s.188 ceased, where the appellants T. Baldwin, ‘Temporary accommodation – eviction without
court order’, see R. (on the application of on the application of N) v. Lewisham LBC [2014] UKSC 62; [2014]
3 W.L.R. 1548, Landlord & Tenant Review, Vol. 31, 2015.
61 Keenan supra note 7.
62 See recent tenants’ rights group ‘Generation Rent’.
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of squatters’ rights and the influence of punks, artists, alternative, autonomist, anarchist
and anti-capitalist politics of all shapes and sizes. There is, arguably, a fourth wave of
squatting happening through eviction resistance where squatting and occupation protests
have returned to contesting space for shelter itself, in light of an era of what Porteous and
Smith would refer to as an era of unabated domicide.
Eviction resistances have emanated across London constituencies of both the Left and
the Right – Newham (‘Focus E-15’), Barnet (‘Sweets Way Resists’), Camden (‘Camden
Resists’), Lambeth (Guinness), Southwark (Aylesbury) – and are combined with the new
confidence of squatted social centres (RadBank and ‘Elephant and Castle Social Centre’
in South London), despite the criminalisation of residential squatting. They have displayed
the contesting of private reappropriation of homes in powerful expressions of collective
strength, and are an emergent movement that demonstrates an ever co-dependent dance
between law and protest. Focus E-15, for instance, has become somewhat of an institution
now, but it began back in September 2013 with twenty-nine young mothers of a homeless
hostel who, according to their blog, were served eviction notices from East Newham
Housing Association as it was selling off the property as a result of local authority cuts to
social housing subsidies.63 They were offered to be rehoused in Manchester, Birmingham
– hundreds of miles away from where they had lived all their lives, their families, their
heritage, their belonging. The young mothers started a stall each Saturday in Stratford
High Street, raising awareness of their plight and the eviction notices they were served,
their slogan ‘social housing not social cleansing’ becoming the byword for a developing
movement. The campaign caught the hearts and minds of many – and since then there
have been marches, celebrity endorsements, appearances of the collective in 2015 at Glas-
tonbury and Brighton Fringe – and is an integral part of a wider mobilisation against
expropriation across London. In a similarmove to theAylesbury occupation in Southwark,
the young mothers highlighted the abandonment and laying to waste of empty social
housing stock by occupying huge swathes of abandoned council housing ready to be
demolished. Similar resistances to housing association and council sell-off prompted
evictions have happened throughout London with extant actions against ‘Annington
Homes’ and ‘Barnet Homes’ happening in Sweets Way Estate,64 Camden Resists and
‘Islington Park Street’ halting their evictions from ‘One Housing Group’ properties.
The Aylesbury estate in Walworth, Southwark, was, similarly, the coming together of
direct housing action through protest and protecting people’s homes through the use of
occupation. This huge action rang similar to protests and squatting going back to the sixties
and seventies where on 31 January 2015, a 500-strong ‘March for Homes’ took place
uniting activists and communities from across London. Part of themarch broke away and
63 See <www.focuse15.org/about> [accessed 20 June 2015].
64 See <https://sweetswayresists.wordpress.com/> [accessed 20 June 2015].
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formed a 150 occupation of ChartridgeHouse on theAylesbury Estate and one of themain
blocks being emptied for demolition and private housing development by Southwark
Council in south-east London. After two weeks of occupation, on 16 February the
authorities accorded a possession order to evict the occupiers. The occupiers remained
until April, while fencing (aptly named ‘Aylesbury Alcatraz’) and heavy security closed in
the remaining residents who were yet to be ‘decanted’, still living in the enclosure of
Aylesburywhile set for demolition as a ‘FirstDevelopment Site’ under theNational Planning
Policy Framework (NPPF) on the redevelopment of brownfield land.
5.5 Domicide: The Forcible Entry of the Marketised State
With an era of strife and austerity, what is important to us is painfully revealed; we feel
the possibility and reality of loss of home, loss of rights, forfeiture all around.Wemay not
always know what justice is, but we certainly identify when a wrong has been done, when
we come face-to-face with a happenstance of injustice. It is this sense of encroachment
that reminds us of our vulnerability, intrusion into our lifeworlds and our sense of propriety,
the importance of our privacy. Arguably, protest and housing are so earthbound and
alluvial, their connection asserts that violations of any rights are always vicariously and
ultimately a violation of one’s home. Whenever we protest we are always claiming an
outrage that emanates from our being, the soul of where and who we come from. We are
housed, either metaphorically or materially, for whatever period of time, in a connection
between land, body, the other, and it has become law’s role as mediator that decides the
limits of one person’s house from another.
But what happens when the law that mediates and divides returns full circle to cross
the barriers it had already set itself to protect, to move the goalposts and come to plunder
on settlements it had previously encroached, uninvited – forcibly entered. What happens
when the raison d’être of law becomes the expropriation of the home itself. To return
home, for capital, means the recrudescence to expropriate what it has already expropriated.
The explosion of eviction resistances demonstrates communities have been simultane-
ously marginalised and radicalised to take direct action by a specifically market-infused
body of law and policy that effects removal, exclusion, eviction, extinguishment of homes
and ways of life of those already existing on the edges of law and agency.
Directly prompting the eviction resistances we have seen in London are the cuts to
public funding of social housing and manipulation of planning procedures, which have
allowed for local authority social housing quotas to be ignored, resulting in housing asso-
ciation sell-offs of hostels, supported homes, shelters for the homeless and vulnerable; the
impending and actual eviction of its residents, tomakeway for newdevelopment schemes.
Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 allows for formalised ‘planning
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gain’, whereby property developers seeking planning approval for projects from local
councils can offer additional benefits to the community in the form of financial support
in order to make their planning applications appear more attractive. Thus, given the eco-
nomically malnourished state councils are in as a result of austerity measures, the bigger
the private property project, themoremoney offset to them; examples such as ‘Lend Lease’
and its controversial combined demolition and development strategy of theHeygate Estate
in Elephant and Castle and the transformation into the sickly ‘Elephant Park’ stand out.
In the words of writer Oliver Wainwright: “The impact of a hundred new homes might
be mitigated by money for extra school places, or traffic calming measures. In practice,
since council budgets have been so viciously slashed, Section 106 has become a primary
means of funding essential public services, from social housing to public parks, health
centres to highways, schools to play areas.”65 As Wainwright reminds us, the market
seduction of planning is not new, as is quite clearly the case of the clever rhetoric of the
NPPF that proclaimed the presumption in favour of sustainable development, meeting
the demands of commerce through encouraging brownfield development in examples
such as Aylesbury.66
Additionally, the proposed ‘right to acquire’ legislation, which would allow housing
association residents to buy their homes, will further reduce social housing stock and,
according to a piece by blogger Amy Ling, is questionable in terms of its legality through
forcing housing associations to sell their property in terms of Article 1 Protocol 1 protec-
tions under the ECHR. She explains that the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions is
a qualified right that following landmark Pye concerning adverse possession and state
limitations on the extent to which property rights can be qualified, such interference with
individual’s rights must be deemed proportionate. Aside from possibly contravening
charity covenants and duties, legislating compulsory sale of housing association property
without rightful compensation from the state would support the argument that the Tory
party’s proposals compelling housing associations to sell off their stock to their occupants
would be a disproportionate measure in the eyes of Pye.67 The ‘Right to Buy and Right to
Acquire Schemes (Research) Bill 2014-2015’ had its First Reading in the House Of Com-
mons 4 February 2015.
As this paper goes to publication, the Housing and Planning Bill 2016 is going through
both houses. The bill is set to consign social housing to the annals of the twentieth century,
eradicating what any reasonable person may understand as ‘affordable housing’ by
65 O.Wainwright, ‘The truth about property developers and how they are exploiting planning authorities and
wrecking our cities’, The Guardian, 17 September 2014, Retrieved on 29 June from 2015 <www.the-
guardian.com/cities/2014/sep/17/truth-property-developers-builders-exploit-planning-cities>.
66 Id.
67 A. Ling, ‘How vulnerable? Re-assessing homelessness’,Keep Calm and Talk Law, Retrieved on 26 June 2015
from <www.keepcalmtalklaw.co.uk/how-vulnerable-re-assessing-homelessness/>.
99
5 ‘Time’s up – Resisting Private Limitations on Rights to Housing and Protest’
replacing the duty to build social housing (schedule 4) with the development of ‘starter
homes’ (part 1, chapter 1, clauses 1-7), the forcing of local housing authorities to sell off
‘high value vacant local authority housing’ (chapter 2, clauses 61-74), the extension of the
right to buy to housing associations (part 4, chapter 1, clauses 56-61), and the phasing out
of secure tenancies for council housing dwellers (part 4, chapter 6, clauses 113-114) effec-
tively eradicating any existing council housing and the prospect of social housing in the
near future. Additionally, the proposed opening up of brownfield sites to ‘permission in
principle’ planning (chapter 4, clauses 102-106; schedule 12) will render local communities
with no say in planning applications (such as licences sought for shale gas exploration and
fracking, and, of course, the knocking down of social housing in order to re-commodify
the land), all decisions being thusmade centrally and not locally, automatically bymaking
already disproportionately high-value land even more unfit for habitation by most of the
population. The effects that this bill will have once given force will be beyond the reach of
discussion in this paper, but will surely be felt by all.
All of the abovewould constitute what Porteous and Smith have referred to as domicide,
the intentional destruction of home, a concept coined back in 2001 and now brought back
to life by insightful critical geographer Nowicki on her work on eviction resistance in the
UK. Their work on domicide has been described as “… crucial because of its emphasis on
the destruction of ‘domus’—home, which in itself elevates andmakes clear the importance
of home. The coining of the word makes it possible to give a voice to all the feelings and
understanding that victims of the process have been unable to articulate, as happened
when the concept of child sexual abuse was named and described”.68 The Canadian
Geographers’ original work on domicide refers to both ‘extreme’ and ‘everyday’ exemplified
by occurrences of intentional expropriation highlighted byNowicki “…frommass displace-
ment through the Syrian civil war to controversial UK housing policy”.69 Because of the
way that identity is nourished and enmeshedwithin the psychological andmaterial confines
of the legal and social home, Hohmann highlights how a totalising appropriation of the
home as an ideological construct can similarly be reinforced through housing policies as
“tools of social reorganisation, even social engineering”70. Thus, Nowicki reinforces how
examples of housing policy and law that result in the wholesale dispossession of peoples
fromwhat they consider to be their space of uninterrupted existence are “where the impact
of these domicidal policies lie in their disruption of the homespaces of particular societal
68 J.D. Porteous & S.E. Smith [Review], ‘Domicide: the global destruction of home’,Housing Studies, Vol. 18,
No. 2, 2003, pp. 269-272.
69 Nowicki supra note 4, p. 786.
70 J. Hohmann inM. Young, ‘Charter eviction: litigating out of house and home’, Journal of Law and Social
Policy, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2015, pp. 46-67, available at: <http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca
/jlsp/vol24/iss1/3/> [accessed 26 June 2015].
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groups, namely those deemedunwilling to identifywith the homeownership-as-aspirational
rhetoric heralded by current and prior governments in the UK since the 1970s”.71
We have seen the domicidal interventions of themarketised state into the lives of those
who can least afford its intrusion through the both glacial and rapid encroachment of the
commodified sphere into the front rooms of the precarious, the doorsteps of those with
no shelter. The uninvited nature of eviction reminds me of the Derridean right to hospi-
tality, “to be hospitable is to let oneself be overtaken, to be ready to not be ready…”,72
where the state is the unsolicited visitor. Derrida heralds the arrival of the spontaneous
guest as an extension “toward the other, extend to the other the gifts, the site, the shelter
and the cover; it must be ready to welcome, to host and shelter, to give shelter and
cover…”,73 and yet in the instance of domicide and eviction resistance, the law is not wel-
come. Unlike in the case of adverse possession, squatting for use or for title, this neo-liber-
alisation of home is the sovereign compromise of its very own right to exclude. Squatting,
or at least the legal fiction of squatters’ rights, recognises the necessity for state protection
of violent entry into the domus, primarily through the Forcible Entry Acts, in existence
since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries following into the modern day possession
order to intercede self-help74 and aggressive entry. Even a proprietorial right created by
wrong can commence a right to exclude, and yet it seems as though the state and capital
have forgotten their beatification of the right to exclude, and reworked the boundaries of
the public and private, with no space left for the subject. This is made clear by returning
to Lewisham LBC the Supreme Court held that Newham and Lewisham could evict the
appellants from Section 188 accommodation without first obtaining a court order. The
same case brought into question the narrow definition of housing in relation to Article 8
protections, whereby the word ‘dwelling’ of settled occupation had more of a technical
forbearance than ‘residence’, and a licence to occupy Section 188 accommodation was not
granted for the purpose of using the premises ‘as a dwelling’. Lord Neuberger and Lady
Hale both dissented, stating dwelling within the Rent Act 1977 should not be read with
such a narrow effect “as they reflected a policy that people who have been lawfully living
in premises should not be summarily evicted”.75
As Van derWalt explains, at common law, eviction cannot be prevented or postponed
by considerations emanating from the socio-economic context or the parties’ personal
circumstances,76 supported and epitomised in the McPhail ruling where contextuality is
71 Nowicki supra note 4, p. 786.
72 J. Derrida, The Gift of Death, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, p. 361.
73 Id., p. 361.
74 Under Civil Procedure Rules 55.5.
75 Baldwin supra note 60.
76 A.J. van der Walt, ‘Housing rights in the intersection between expropriation and eviction law’ in L. Fox
O’Mahoney & J. Sweeney (Eds.), The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and Dispossession, Ashgate Pub-
lishing, Farnham, 2011.
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denied, self-help on the part of the removed landowner is viable, and once a possession
order is commenced by a court it cannot be stopped. Yet the new equity of proportionality
in possession claims, both at vertical and horizontal reach between state and private parties,
may allow for auditing the systematic spread of domicide in the case of those with no
proprietorial claim to their home. As Nield reminds us, Manchester CC v. Pinnock,
Hounslow LBC v. Powell and Leeds CC v. Hall and Birmingham CC v. Frisby (Powell)
“finally acknowledges the reality of a protection for home occupiers derived from the right
to respect for the home found in Article 8 where any person at risk of being dispossessed
of his home at the suit of a local authority should in principle have the right to raise the
question of proportionality of the measure”77 in light of Article 8 protections. Further
horizontal interpretation of Article 8 has been afforded beyondMalik in recentManchester
Ship Canal aswell asMcDonald v.McDonald (albeit distinguished fromMalik). If legislators
can shape shift in and around the right to exclude, then so too can informal home rights
develop in a similarly liminal manner. According to Baldwin, “It is clear that English law
has moved away from the absolutist rhetoric, and rule-based, acontextual enforcement of
exclusion rights […] and space has been created for argumentation and adjudication in
possession disputes taking account of Article8 rights, at least in exceptional cases. That
development suggests the need for changes to legal rules that provide for automatic
enforcement of owners’ exclusion rights without scope for proportionality review, such
as that established inMcPhail”.78
Helen Carr and David Cowan refer to the neo-liberalisation of social housing as its
‘residualisation’.79 The violent effects of residualisation mean that not just homes but also
people disappear. If it is not enough to remove all housing safety nets, wholesale cuts to
housing legal aid and housing welfare, the notorious bedroom tax, the removal of security
of tenure, then there are Public Space Protection Orders (PSPO) once you are finally on
the street, helpless, distraught and categorically anti-social.
Further confusing the public and private, it is not easy to clearly distinguish between
government acquisition and commercial acquisition. In theAylesbury case and theHeygate
estate acquired to be transformed into the Elephant Park example, state compulsory pur-
chase can be confusedwith state-sanctioned commercial development acquisitions allowed
through malleable planning procedures. This lack of distinction between state and com-
merce is, of course, what we understand as neo-liberalism, but it feels as though that term
is tired and no longer does justice to the violent biopolitics exemplified in resistances
spoken of in this piece.
77 Nield & Hopkins supra note 30.
78 Baldwin supra note 60.
79 H. Carr & D. Cowan, ‘The social tenant, the law and the UK’s politics of austerity’, Oñati Socio-legal Series
[online], Vol. 5, No. 1, 2015, pp. 73-89, Retrieved on 29 June 2015 from<www.ssrn.com/abstract=2565733>.
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After coming into contact with the inspiring work of ‘ecosopher’ Aetzel Griffieon as a
result of an engagement with the squatting scene in the Netherlands through the recent
‘White Paper: The Law’ art,80 law and resistance project of artist Adelita Husni-Bey, I can
see Griffieon’s Guattarian-infused assertion from ‘The Three Ecologies’ (1989) that we are
living in an age of ‘integrated world capitalism’ (IWC) as so clear in the law that affects
domicide.81 IWC is, as explained byGriffieon as he introduces his ‘speculative’ suggestions
to counter IWC, an integration of market and state where the government and market
have become as one through the ‘pincer and scissor’ of IWC as it ‘valorises’ human activity,
ostensibly the reduction of the characteristically separate values of life and what it is to be
human, into interchangeable economic value. Griffieon relates this to Naomi Klein’s
understanding of ‘extractivism’ from her ‘This Changes Everything: Capitalism vClimate’
(2014), being, “... the widermentality of making profit without caringmuch for the conse-
quences”.82
Griffieon asserts the Guattarian claim that to counter IWC is “to revive forms of soli-
darity it is therefore necessary to work directly on the subjectivities of people inside and
outside of the market-state”.83 It is arguable that this bifurcatory, paradigmatic shift in
thinking and practice is produced in the performances of resistances that we are seeing in
RadBank, Sweets Way Resists, Focus E-15 and so on. An emergent network of alternative
organisation that exists on the actuality and potentiality of creating new commons out of
commodified others; an explosive and revolutionary metabolism that demands our
attention.
5.6 Protest to Home from One Moment to the Next
Despite the preponderance of domicidal measures, Nowicki refers to the work of Baxter
and Brickell in their conception of home-unmaking,84 which considers “the temporal,
material and geographic fluidity of the homespace” whereby a home at once can be under
threat and yet not long after can become safe and revitalised again:
Home and the destroyed home are not static, unchanging sites of comfort and
consolation as traditional assumptions of home would suggest. Rather, home
is made, unmade and remade across the lifecourse, subject to a seemingly
80 Husni-Bey supra note 24.
81 See F. Guattari, ‘The three ecologies’, in A. Griffioen (Ed.), Short Remarks on an Ecosophical Pedagogy, Le
Merle, Montreal, 1989.
82 See N. Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism v Climate, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2014.
83 Guattari supra note 81.
84 K. Brickell & R. Baxter, ‘For home unmaking’, Home Cultures, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2014, pp. 133-143.
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unending variety of factors: financial, conjugal, sociopolitical and so on.Home
can shift from a site of safety to a site of violence, and back again.85
In this sense Nowicki asserts a link between the right to housing and the right to protest
through the unworking and reworking of the home from the site of resistance to the domain
of the domestic and back again. She has cited the impact of Section 144 on the criminali-
sation of squatting in residential buildings, which has in turn led to an increased squatting
of commercial buildingswhereby “home-unmaking has the potential to be simultaneously
liberating and disempowering in different ways”,86 and thus, squatters have adapted to the
changes and “rema[de] their homespaces in response to domicide being imposed upon
them”. This tactic of eviction resistance and social centres is a politics of procrastination
where a bidding for time and stalling a possession order allow for a Hakim Beyian,87 now
‘TAZ’, a ‘temporary autonomous zone’ of property for use or even a ‘temporary autonomous
home’. The temporal non-linearity between protest andhomebrings us to an understanding
that they are one and the same, just a matter of adaptation, survival and existence, despite
all else. It is through the human emotions of fear and anger, loss and outrage, vulnerability
and dispossession that we find them enmeshed as ethics towards ourselves, the community
and the capability of compromising exclusion no matter what.
So what does this piece on domicide, resistance and the home tell us about the private
limitations on the right to protest and the right to housing? It seems as though, on the one
hand, the encroachment of private property rights is creating these zones both spatially
and temporally where a new conception of use-based property can come to life, through
resistance itself, while at the same time questioning of what ultimately the homemeans in
relation to protest, what private and publicmean, and any integral understanding of human
privation. The eviction resistances demonstrate this further encroachment of private
property into homes through law’s disregard of its own rules on due process and forcible
entry, ending in the most public carnival of dispossession, the threat of dispossession –
the occupation of homes, about homes.
Through discussing the coming together of housing and protest in squatting and
eviction resistance, we can see the integral link between the two. It is also very clear how
the destruction and violence of expropriation is played out and implemented in a systematic
manner through statute and common law as it shape-shifts the liminal of the public and
private domains. Narrow national legal categorisations of home as dwelling, the benignity
of the right to housing and right to private and family life arguments against paper title
owner claims, and recent changes to squatting and planning laws in favour of private
85 Id.
86 Nowicki supra note 4.




property and commercial interests, the neo-liberalisation of social housing, the gaining
encroachment of commodification to the point of forcible entry, deliberately stop short of
the existential and material reality of our social, cultural and economic needs for habitus.
By denying what we need in law to feel at home, civil and political crises occur, creating a
social cleansing tantamount to domicide (following the inspiring work on domicide and
eviction resistance of Nowicki) where vulnerability to eviction and expropriation is ubiq-
uitary. It will be interesting to question the extent to which the temporal effluxion of pos-
session and occupation gives rise to an evolving conception of home within protests in
future, whether using human rights obligations or otherwise, and howprotest can epitomise
a transient habitat, a place to be, if only for a moment.
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